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15 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

		25X1A5a1	_	
SUBJECT:	Conversation with		November	25th
25X1A9a PRESENT:				
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- current reading in the Soviet theoretical journals convinces him that the key problem confronting the Soviet leaders at the XXI Party Congress is the overall integration of the Bloc. It is significant that Khrushchev's first speech explaining his Theses for the Congress was delivered before the Military Academy.
- 2. The Soviet leader's first concern is to establish the fact that the USSR is still the leading power of the Socialist "system," ahead of China, and is the first to embark on the actual building of Communism. This whole problem involving relative stages of advancement of Socialist countries is very delicate and requires careful propaganda handling. Thus the elaborate reception for Gomulka and the numerous speeches emphasizing friendship were intended to demonstrate the unity of the Western half of the Socialist bloc in confrontation with Asiatic Communism. Gomulka, who is a rather simple and not very profound thinker, is being treated as the first among the satellite leaders. However, Trybuna Ludu presents a somewhat different angle, stressing the strong independent role of Poland which may be summed up with the phrase "Moscow trusts us." By the same token the buildup of crisis atmosphere around Berlin is probably aimed in considerable measure at the satellites.
- 3. Revisionism is generally described as every form of anti-Soviet movement, just as in the '30s it was identified with Trotskyism. Revisionism is presented as a big international movement with a single directing center, the USA. Thus the satellite revisionists are in effect capitalist aggreea531
- 4. notes that there appears to be in fact a movement to establish some sort of a revisionist International movement, using European émigrés primarily. It is possible that this movement may even be Moscow-inspired, with the objective of concentrating the enemy

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for attack, knowing that it is actually impossible for the widely scattered revisionists to achieve any real unity. notes that there has been no systematic Western analysis of revisionism - it is essentially an ideological as well as a political attack on the basis of Marxism. We tend to accept as well as identify it as an anti-Soviet movement but have not gone to the roots of 25X1A5a1analysis. Commenting on individual revisionist currents, noted that the Yugoslavs are not particularly proficient in the ideological field and that Djilas's knowledge of Marxism is poor. The Polish revisionists represent a form of "romantic socialism," turned against Moscow as the center of "state capitalism", Polish revisionism has turned to the Yugoslavs for inspiration but the roots are weak. Somewhat more impressive are the German revisionists such as Harich and they Hungarian Lukacs. 6. suggested that even the Yugoslav opposition may have some value to Moscow as providing a demonstration that roads to Communism may in fact differ somewhat. He does not suggest that Tito is actually a Soviet agent but that he may play a role which they can exploit, especially in his relations with the Middle East neutralists. It would be better for the Kremlin if he were in the Bloc but, even as it is, he can be exploited. He compared this with the role of Trotskyism which, even in opposition, plays a useful role for International Communism, especially in Latin America and certain underdeveloped countries. He finds it noteworthy that the Communist press has not denounced the recent Congress of the Fourth International or the Trotskyite publications in France. Incidentally, he noted that the Fourth International had published the best commentary on the Khrushchev speech denigrating Stalin. In sum, even though dissident, Tito is useful as a representative of the broad Communist ideal. 25X1A5a1 Turning to the XXI Congress, felt that it would not attempt any reevaluation of Stalin's role since that has been sufficiently established by Khrushchev and others in the wake of the XX Party Congress. Essentially, Stalin's concept of the two camps still dominates Communist thinking, although with some modification and liberalization. suggested that the aggressive program of the CPSU will require a sharp increase of Party discipline and may even lead to new


purges. He notes that in Party publications, especially Party Life, there is almost an excess of writing on discipline and ideology. The concept of

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"Democratic Socialism" derived from Leni25X1A5atiated with his recommendation of an eternal purge. reminded us that the mass purge conducted by Lenin in 1921-22 as a preparation for the NEP era resulted in the elimination of 600, 000 Party members. This is much more typical of the Leninist concept of purge than those of 1936-38 which were characteristically totalitarian and terrorist.

- 9. The present moment is difficult for the Soviet Union. It must push the building of Socialism in many countries a sort of NEP. At the same time it must pursue the eternal struggle with capitalism under the mantle of peaceful coexistence. In order to carry this out and to avoid demoralization, the Party must be strictly disciplined.
- 10. The economic program announced in the Theses is truly fantastic and will require full mobilization of the national effort. For this the Party is at present too democratic. The fact, noted above, that it is using relatively obscure figures in much of the theoretical writing, suggests that it may be preparing some sort of conflict between the leaders and the masses. There is no reason to feel that the Party has any fear of the Army. Indeed, one must read all its statements from the viewpoint of Communism and not that of the West. As is well known, the Party predominates over the state, although \$\text{A5a1}\$ and \$\text{A5a1}\$ ion with the satellites the Soviet state plays a key role.

 does not anticipate that there will be announcements of new changes in the Central Committee or in the Army leadership since this is after all an extraordinary and not an ordinary Party Congress.
- 11. Touching briefly on relations with China, he noted that earlier moves for introduction of even a limited amount of Chinese labor into the USSR required long and delicate tactical negotiations.



Chief, SRS/DDI